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Originally Posted by Double penetrAtion Indeed. But science in general is a very factual matter, whereas morality is not. |
In what ways? It could just be that the facts of morality are much more difficult to isolate and analyze, as they don't deal with physical objects (other than humans, trivially, but I don't mean in that sense).
Btw, for everyone my last post was directed at,
the current (as of 2009) leaning of moral philosophers is toward moral realism (at that link, go down to the Meta-ethics section), which Wikipedia describes thusly:
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Originally Posted by Wikipedia Moral Realism article Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of cognitivism. Moral realism stands in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.
According to Richard Boyd,[1] moral realism means that:
"Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false, etc.);
"The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.;
"Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge."
Most philosophers today accept or lean towards moral realism, as do most meta-ethicists, and twice as many philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism as accept or lean towards moral anti-realism.[2] Some examples of robust moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton,[3] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[4] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[5] Russ Shafer-Landau,[6] G.E. Moore,[7] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[8] Thomas Nagel, and Plato. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[9] |
I haven't been able to place myself firmly in any camp yet, but moral philosophy is a lot more complex than I've seen many people on forums make it out to be, and I like to make people aware of said fact. Disagreement on what is moral and what is not shows, without a deep investigation, only that the issues are difficult to resolve, not that they resolve differently depending solely, partly, or perhaps even at all, on the opinion of the subject.